The Biden administration does not want to be consumed by the Middle East, but it also needs to do enough to manage what is happening in the region to avoid getting caught up in it while offering worse options at higher costs.
The Middle East has ways to impose itself on the President of the United States and his government. Just ask President Joe Biden. Through six phone calls with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as with Palestinian National Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian President Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi, he understood that no matter what What hope does he have, his personal involvement is necessary to help achieve a ceasefire. Moreover, although the trip to the Middle East is not on his agenda at this time, Secretary of State Anthony Brinken believes that it is necessary to go to the region to work to strengthen the ceasefire, address the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of Gaza, and establish a management system for Israeli-Palestinian relations and renew efforts. To establish the diplomatic track of the relationship between the two peoples for the results of the two peoples.
As someone who has negotiated with all parties for decades, I know that each of these tasks contains its own challenges. Ironically, the least difficult thing is to support a ceasefire. It is true that this is a ceasefire, and there is no agreement on anything except to stop the firing of weapons, but the fact is that both sides have reasons to stop. Hamas has paid a heavy price for its military infrastructure and has achieved its goal: to impose a price on Israel in response to the events in Jerusalem and make Hamas the focus of the Palestinian cause rather than the Palestinian Authority. West bank. As far as Israel is concerned, it has also achieved military success mainly through air strikes: it destroyed Hamas rocket production facilities and key parts of the tunnel network that protects Hamas weapons, fighter jets, intelligence and weapons. Even some of its commanders. At a time when international public opinion has strongly opposed Israel, additional strikes will only produce diminishing returns at best. Nevertheless, even if ending the fire may be in the interests of both parties, a ceasefire does not necessarily occur without mediators and external intervention-the Egyptian and Biden governments played this role, creating cover, pressure, and explanation for both.
How to solve humanitarian needs and reconstruction issues? Before being criticized for expressing the truth, UNRWA Gaza Director Matthias Schmale admitted that the Israeli attack was cruel but precise, and the opening of the Kerem Shalom border crossing There is no shortage of food, fuel or medicine in Gaza. However, reconstruction is urgently needed, and another 77,000 Gazans are left homeless. Infrastructure, especially water and sewage, urgently needs repair and reconstruction. Moreover, there is a real challenge here: how to rebuild Gaza, rather than let Hamas transfer materials for rearming. Secretary of State Blincoln acknowledged this problem and emphasized when he was in Jerusalem that “we will work with our partners… to ensure that Hamas will not benefit from reconstruction assistance.”
It won’t be easy. After the conflict in 2014, a similar attempt was made using the Gaza reconstruction mechanism, but it failed. It is true that the promise of reconstruction funds has not been fulfilled, but this is at least partly due to the failure to prevent material transfers and Hamas’ military buildup. To understand the scope and scale of Hamas’ failure to reorganize its armaments, consider the following factors: At the beginning of the conflict in 2014, a conflict that lasted 51 days, Hamas had approximately 10,000 rockets and 4,500 rockets were launched. Israel intercepted approximately 2,200—meaning Hamas eventually retained approximately 3,300 rockets. In 2021, Hamas had 30,000 rockets and launched 4,350 in 10 days. Not only has the number increased by a factor of 10, but Hamas has a rocket with a longer range and more payload-and it can launch more every day. But this is not just the establishment of its arsenal. In 2014, Israel sent troops to the ground and destroyed 32 tunnels, 14 of which entered Israel from Gaza. In 2021, the Israeli military reported that it destroyed approximately 60 miles of the Hamas tunnel network, which the IDF called the “Metro”. But this is not the subway system, because it is to protect Hamas and not the public in Gaza.
For Gaza, 50% of the unemployment rate before the conflict and 80% of the public depended on United Nations assistance. Think about all the cement, steel, wires, and wood used to build this underground network—60 miles is just part of it. Something built by Si. (Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, claimed that only 5% of tunnels were destroyed.) On the ground, even before this conflict (destroying 1,100 buildings and damaging more than 7,000), Gaza was in desperate need of construction , And invest to create jobs. But this is not a concern or priority for Hamas-its first task is to restore its arsenal and use its fighter jets to rebuild and expand its tunnel network.
Therefore, international efforts are absolutely required, preferably by the United States to mobilize to raise funds, but an international mechanism also needs to be established to monitor what enters Gaza, it is transferred to a warehouse, and then its final use is on construction sites. Unlike before, Egypt can play a key role on the border. With international assistance, Egypt can transform the Rafah border crossing, which currently only accepts personnel, to make it a central node for thorough inspections of all materials entering Gaza with the Israeli border crossing. All trucks transporting materials have designated routes, need to be equipped with GPS tracking equipment, and all incoming warehouses need cameras for 24/7 monitoring. From border crossings to warehouses, and from warehouses to construction sites, all movements must be monitored by a multinational team-some on the ground in Gaza, and some, perhaps including Americans, electronically monitored from the outside. If there is any transfer, the process will simply stop, including the movement of any other building materials.
Hamas will resist this, but if it does, the problem will become one of the problems of the reconstruction of Gaza and the rearming of Hamas. If questions are raised credibly in this way, Hamas prices in Gaza, the region, and internationally will rise. In addition, this is not just a framework issue, it is fundamentally practical. If strict conditions are not imposed, there will be no real reconstruction: if Hamas can transfer materials, rebuild its arsenal, and trigger a war when it meets its goal of taking over the Palestinian national movement, then no one will invest in reconstruction on a large scale . As Hamas has just stated again, if it believes it can gain political benefits, it does not care much about the price the Palestinians in Gaza will pay. Hamas is good at killing Palestinians, but not good at advancing their cause.
This reminds us that we should also work hard to support the Palestinian Authority (PA) and do more to help it succeed economically. Any international effort against Gaza should include assistance to the West Bank-this was proposed by Secretary of State Brinken during his visit. However, just as there should be conditions to ensure that Hamas will not transfer materials in Gaza, direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority must be linked to real reforms of transparency and the rule of law. If there is no reform process, our assistance to the West Bank should be limited to projects that benefit the Palestinians (especially roads, water, sewage treatment and health), but will not be managed by the Palestinian Authority.
Finally, diplomacy should now focus on generating functional day-to-day cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. At this stage, direct negotiations on the issue of permanent status will be of no avail-the political, substantive real differences between the parties and the public’s distrust guarantee that nothing will be achieved. However, efforts should be made to build on the normalization process and allow Arab countries to have more contacts with Israel in exchange for the measures Israel has taken against the Palestinians. The UAE model provides complete normalization of non- annexation—and of course the U.S. critical security commitment to the UAE. Why not learn from this model and quietly explore with Saudi Arabia the option menu of steps they might take against Israel? They will seek the steps the Israelis have taken against the Palestinian Authority; and the promises they want us to make. (One possibility may be a partial normalization, such as opening a Saudi commercial and trade office in Tel Aviv in exchange for Israel’s no longer building on 92% of the land east of the security barrier or outside settlements; and, because of Palestine People should participate in the intermediary of any such parallel steps, and the Palestinian Authority terminates the preferential and higher monthly benefits to the families of people detained in Israeli prisons for acts of violence against Israelis.)
Yes, given the opposition of the settlers, Israeli politics may even make it difficult to freeze construction outside the bloc, especially the new coalition government has agreed not to try to resolve issues such as Palestinians whose members disagree. But there are two points worth mentioning: First, the conflict with Hamas shows that the Palestinian issue cannot be ignored and will affect the interior of Israel-which means that the new government needs to formulate policies. Second, despite the opposition of some settlers, 80% of the Israeli public supports normalization with the UAE instead of annexing the territory allocated to Israel under Trump’s plan. Moreover, in the recent conflict, although the UAE and other countries that have reconciled with Israel condemned their actions in Jerusalem (as Egypt and Jordan did), no one took any other actions in response to the battle with Hamas. ——This reflects the importance they attach to Hamas and its agreement with Israel. (It is worth noting that Israel and the UAE concluded a tax treaty to prevent double taxation on May 31 after the ceasefire.) The normalization process is a new factor in the region that can be used to break the Israelis and Palestinians The stalemate between the two, and the new Israeli government will be interested in achieving what it can do beyond Netanyahu.